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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a study that aims to answer two 
important questions related to targeted location-sharing 
privacy attacks: (1)  given a group of users and their social 
graph, is it possible to predict which among them is likely 
to reveal most about their whereabouts, and (2) given a 
user, is it possible to predict which among her friends 
knows most about her whereabouts. To answer these 
questions we analyse the privacy policies of users of a real-
time location sharing application, in which users actively 
shared their location with their contacts. The results show 
that users who are central to their network are more likely 
to reveal most about their whereabouts. Furthermore, we 
show that the friend most likely to know the whereabouts of 
a specific individual is the one with most common contacts 
and/or greatest number of contacts. 
Author Keywords
Location sharing, privacy, privacy attacks.
ACM Classification Keywords
H5.m. Information interfaces and presentation (e.g., HCI): 
Miscellaneous.
General Terms
Experimentation, Human Factors.
INTRODUCTION
The study tries to answer two important questions relating 
to targeted location-sharing privacy attacks. First, given a 
group of users and the social ties amongst them, is it 
possible to predict which of these users is likely to reveal 
the most about their whereabouts? Second, given an 
individual user within a particular social network, is it 
possible to predict which of her friends knows most about 
her whereabouts? To answer these, the paper presents a 
longitudinal study of real-time location sharing whereby the 
patterns of information exchange and privacy policies of a 
large group of users are analysed and modelled. 
Real-time location sharing applications are gaining wide 
adoption, with a number of commercial systems now 
available on the market, including Foursquare, Facebook 
Places, and Google Latitude. Such services are frequently 
used in the context of online social networks (OSN), 
whereby one’s real-time location becomes yet another 
sharable aspect of one’s online profile.  With the increasing 
adoption of online location sharing services, understanding 
the privacy implications and potential targeted attacks 
enabled by this new technology, becomes crucial.
A conventional approach for engineering a privacy attack is 
to attempt to gain ongoing access to the target’s 
whereabouts, thereby building up a profile of that user’s 
behaviour.  In this paper, we assume that location sharing 
practices are likely to follow the trend of other OSN profile 
properties and propagate through the network of friends. 
The key assumption, therefore, is that a target’s location can 
be visible to friends of friends. From the attacker’s 
perspective, this has the benefit that they do not get “too 
close” to the target while still they are able to collect 
information about the target’s location on an ongoing basis.
The two questions that this paper addresses are key in 
instrumenting a targeted attack against users.  Such an 
attack would first identify a suitable target amongst a set of 
users. Once this has been achieved, the attacker then 
identifies a “weak link” in the target’s list of friends. The 
“weak link” is a friend of the target whom the attacker will 
attempt to befriend in order to gain direct access to the 
target’s whereabouts by becoming a friend of a friend. 
Therefore, the attacker is likely to seek for weak links who 
are most likely to have full access to the whereabouts of the 
target.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
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RELATED WORK
Sharing perceptions and strategies
Substantial research shows that people approach for 
developing rules and ultimately policies for sharing 
information with others are strongly related to the 
presentation of self [13], and also relate to the formulation 
of dialectic and dynamic behavioural mechanisms 
depending on circumstantial context [2] or the conjugation 
of disclosure, identity and temporal boundaries [24]. What 
was once achieved with walls, doors and other physical or 
architectural constraints is still to be adapted to today’s 
communication means [34]. Privacy management is an 
intricate process and is further augmented in a computer 
mediated environment. On social networking sites, privacy 
regulation is a socio-technical activity involving interaction 
with the technological system and the group context. 
Individuals’ privacy behaviour in such systems involves a 
mixture of technical and mental strategies. For instance, a 
technical strategy may involve the use of privacy settings to 
regulate content distribution to select audiences [30], while 
research has also shown that considering tie strength is 
another strategy for developing rules for disclosure [36]. 
Despite the evidence suggesting that users adopt objective 
strategies for controlling their privacy online, previous 
work has identified a discrepancy between people’s privacy 
attitudes towards sharing information and their actual 
sharing patters [1,23]. This behaviour has been termed the 
“privacy paradox”. For instance, a study revealed a high 
discrepancy between stated concerns and actual behaviour 
towards sharing static profile information on Facebook [1]. 
Other studies have further established the privacy paradox 
on social networking sites [34]. 
While it is not clear whether the privacy paradox also 
applies to people’s perceptions towards location sharing, it 
certainly highlights the needs for collecting quantitative 
data on people’s location-sharing behaviour rather than 
relying purely on subjective data.
Location-sharing privacy
There is an increasing amount of work on understanding 
users’ location-privacy needs in ubiquitous and location-
aware systems relying on techniques such as diary studies 
[4], interviews [14], surveys [17], scenarios [16, 35] and lab 
and field observations [5]. Research suggests that users may 
start with relatively coarse and conservative preferences 
[28]. Over time, they take advantage of controls exposed to 
them and exhibit more sophisticated sharing behaviours, 
controlling the availability of the data through mechanisms 
such as disabling the service [4] or obtaining feedback 
about which users can see or have seen their information 
[14,16,28,33]. Users are also sceptical about the usefulness 
of location sharing in day-to-day activities, suggesting that 
current practices (such as calling somebody up) are 
sufficient [4]. However, the usefulness of such services was 
acknowledged in more stressful situations involving 
unfamiliar environments or in crisis and safety scenarios in 
general [14]. In such situations, information usefulness 
outweighs privacy concerns.  Furthermore, prior work has 
shown that people’s presence in different physical 
environments is likely to affect their willingness to trust and 
actually engage in interaction with location-based services 
[18].
Research investigating sophisticated privacy mechanisms, 
such as customizable privacy policies, has indicated that, 
without new interface technologies, they can present 
significant challenges for users. One recent study reports 
participants failing to implement their desired policies with 
a high degree of accuracy [28]. Furthermore, it also noted 
that although participants varied considerably in the time 
they spent defining their policies (between 5 and 8 
minutes), the duration of this period was not strongly 
correlated to final policy accuracy.
It has also been observed that the recipients of the location 
data are typically more significant to users than the 
locations being shared. Perhaps unsurprisingly, users are 
more willing to share information with friends than 
acquaintances or strangers [5,33]. While recipient identity 
seems to be the strongest factor influencing one’s 
willingness to share her location [10,20] time and location 
restrictions have been shown to also be important in 
capturing people’s preferences [5]. Research has also shown 
that users are sensitive to the reactions of recipients if 
location information is denied or not made available [14, 
28], suggesting that systems need to incorporate an element 
of plausible deniability. However, users do make 
distinctions in sharing particular locations: additional 
privacy is required at home when compared to work [31]. 
Privacy attacks on OSNs
Targeted privacy attacks on OSNs have been demonstrated 
in the past.  Attempts to construct social graphs for 
individuals from available public listings are already shown 
to be feasible [6]. Once achieved, social graphs can be 
clustered for segregating groups into sub-groups in terms of 
different spheres of activity for an individual [37,15]. 
Further results show that even hidden communities can be 
detected with reasonable effort [22]. This work shows that 
given an individual of interest, it is possible to identify a 
close group around that person, which may potentially be 
used in order to get closer to the target. To some extent, this 
is already done by authorities targeting criminals 
coordinating their activities using OSNs [7,9], and it usually 
involves some level of active probing [29] which in the 
context of OSNs may mean striking friendships with 
individuals close to the target so as to avoid detection.
The characteristics of privacy attacks in the context of 
location sharing differ from privacy attacks online social 
networks because of two reasons. Location-sharing 
applications include information about users’ physical 
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whereabouts, which can lead to access to one’s physical 
self.  Empirical evidence show that users fear that revealing 
their location to people they do not trust may lead to 
physical and property harm [32].  Furthermore, users’ 
decisions on location sharing may differ considerably than 
decisions taken in the context of social networks, making 
this subject worthwhile of investigation. 
Identifying “weak links”
Prior work on social networks may be used to derive some 
hypotheses about who is likely to share information with 
whom on a social network.  For instance, Petronio’s theory 
of Communications Privacy Management (CPM) describes 
an iterative process of rule development, boundary 
coordination and boundary turbulence [25]. Rule 
development can be defined as the process of developing 
regulations about who to tell what. These regulations guide 
our everyday disclosures, and are a function of our context 
and disclosure goals. Ties of differing strength have varying 
disclosure norms, thus Stutzman theorizes rule development 
is a function of network composition [30].  For example, a 
network that is more heavily focused on strong ties may 
require higher levels of privacy, as disclosures among 
strong ties are more personal in nature [36]. This suggests 
that network structure may be used as a basis for attempting 
to predict disclosures amongst individuals.
Recent work on sharing ephemeral information shows that 
rule development is a function of tie strength [27]. In order 
to test CPM’s rule development process on the context of 
posting content to Facebook, users were presented various 
scenarios of information disclosure and were prompted to 
decide how and with whom to share that information with. 
Results show users are more prone to share with stronger 
ties as opposed to weak ties. These findings where uniform 
across the various scenarios of information disclosure 
presented to participants. Intended and expected audience 
for both profile and ephemeral information was a function 
of tie strength [27,30]. Both authors report that users’ 
perceived audience for the information they share is mostly 
composed of strong ties. 
STUDY
Definitions 
The following are definitions of metrics used in the study 
that follows.
• Social Graph: A set of individuals and the explicit 
friendship ties amongst them.
• Degree Centrality : The degree centrality of a user is the 
number of direct connections (or “friends”) that the user 
has in the social graph. These were the friends of the user 
on Facebook that were also users of Locaccino.
• Betweenness Centrality : The betweenness centrality of a 
user is the number of shortest paths between all pairs of 
nodes in the social graph that pass through the node 
representing the user. For a more thorough description of 
the betweenness centrality, the reader is directed to [11].
• Openness : The openness of the ordered pair (A, B)  of 
users is the percentage of simulated location requests 
made to A by B that were granted by A’s policies.
• Trust : The trust of a user A is the mean of the openness 
values (A, B) where B ranges over all of A’s friend. i.e. it 
is the average openness of user A towards all her friends.
• Trustworthiness : The trustworthiness of a user A is the 
mean of the openness values (B, A) where B ranges over 
all of A’s friends. i.e. it is the average openness of A’s 
friends towards A. 
• Trust Rank : Given a user A and a user B who is a friend 
of A, the trust rank of B with respect to A is i if there are 
precisely i-1 friends C1, C2 ... Ci-1 of A such that the 
openness of (A, Cj) , 1≤j<i, is greater than the openness 
of (A, B).  i.e. the trust rank is obtained by ranking A’s 
friends in terms of how much they are trusted by A.
• Degree Rank : Given a user A and a user B who is a 
friend of A, the degree rank of B with respect to A is i if 
there are precisely i-1 friends C1, C2 ... Ci-1 of A such that 
the degree centralities of C1, C2 ... Ci-1 are greater than that 
of B. i.e. the degree rank is obtained by ranking A’s 
friends in terms of their degree centralities.
• Mutual Rank : Given a user A and a user B who is a 
friend of A, the mutual rank of B with respect to A is i if 
there are precisely i-1 friends C1, C2 ... Ci-1 of A such that 
the number of common friends A has with each of C1, 
C2 ... Ci-1 is greater than the number of common friends 
that A has with B. i.e. the mutual rank is obtained by 
ranking A’s friends in terms of how many mutual friends 
they have with A.
Hypotheses
Previous work suggests a relationship between social 
network structure, tie strength and the patterns of disclosure 
amongst individuals (e.g. [30]). In attempting to identify 
which individual is more likely to reveal information about 
their whereabouts, one may hypothesise that individuals 
who are more central to the network are more likely to do 
so. A possible explanation would be that such individuals 
are more likely to engage in collaboration and coordination 
activities, therefore it may be more likely that they are 
willing to share their real-time location with others. This 
reasoning provides ground for the first experimental 
hypothesis:
• H1: Individuals who are more central to the social graph 
are likely to reveal the most about their location.
Upon determining a suitable person to target, the next step 
in a potential attack would be to befriend someone from the 
target’s social network.  Considering that previous literature 
Paper Session: How Close? UbiComp'11 / Beijing, China
179
suggests that reciprocity is an important driving force in 
social networks [26], one can expect that the target is likely 
to share their location with someone in the social network 
out of their desire to reciprocate. Hence, the friend of the 
target with the most number friends, who by means of H1 is 
likely to share their own location, is someone with whom 
the target may wish to share their location in order to 
reciprocate. That person is therefore a potential “weak link” 
whom the attacker might befriend in order to get closer to 
the target. This leads to the second experimental hypothesis: 
• H2: The target’s friend with the highest degree has higher 
probability of knowing more about the target.
Finally, it can be argued that shared membership and being 
part of the same community would be suggestive of two 
individuals who may be possibly involved in joint activities 
requiring coordination. In addition, literature on homophily 
has shown that individuals who share mutual friends are 
more likely to be alike, thus likely to engage in joint 
activities [21,8]. It is therefore plausible to hypothesise that 
individuals who belong to the same group are more likely to 
share their real-time location with each other, thus 
becoming candidate “weak links”. This leads to the third 
experimental hypothesis:
• H3: The target’s friend with most common ties with the 
target knows most about the target.
To test these hypotheses, the location-sharing system 
described next was deployed and used by a large group of 
users longitudinally.
System
The study was conducted by deploying Locaccino, a real-
time location sharing application integrated in the OSN 
Facebook. The application consists of two components: a 
Web application component and a mobile component. 
Various version of the mobile component were developed to 
run on multiple mobile platforms: windows and apple 
laptops, and Symbian smartphones. The purpose of this 
component is to collect in real-time a user’s location and 
then upload it to a central server.
The Web application component of Locaccino (Figure 1)
allows users to set preferences regarding how their location 
is shared with their Facebook contacts.  Users are given the 
option to create policies in order to manage their location 
sharing. Policies specify the conditions under which the 
location should be revealed to another user. These 
conditions include the identity of the recipient of the 
information, the time and day, and the actual location where 
the user is.  For instance, one may specify a policy to allow 
work colleagues to obtain one’s location only during work 
hours and when they are in town.
Participants were recruited on campus using advertisements 
on-line and via email, as well as through national press 
covering the features of our system.
The system was used longitudinally and more than 300 
users installed the application and actively begun using it to 
share their location with colleagues.  For the purposes of the 
study presented here, the following information was 
collected about users:
• Social graph: An undirected unweighted graph describing 
the friendship between all the participants. In this graph, 
a node represents a user, and two nodes are connected if 
they are friends on Facebook.
• Policy graph: A directed weighted graph describing the 
privacy policies between the users. In this graph each 
node represents a user, and user A is connected to user B 
if user if these two users are friends on Facebook. In 
addition, the weight of the edge from user A to user B is a 
value between 0 and 1 based on the “openness” of user A 
towards user B.  The weight of the opposite edge, i.e. the 
openness of user B towards user A, is independent and 
may be a different. 
The openness value of (A,B) was calculated as the 
percentage of B’s possible requests that were granted by A’s 
policies.  The openness value from one user towards 
another represents the extent to which a user is willing to 
share their location with another user. In our case we rely 
on users’ policies to capture and quantify this feature. 
Specifically, to generate a value representative of the 
openness between two users we conducted the following 
procedure.  For each pair of users (A,B) in the dataset we 
ran a simulation whereby user B repeatedly requested the 
location of user A. These simulated requested were 
processed by the policies of user A, and the result was 
either positive or negative, thereby either showing or hiding 
user A’s location respectively. During this analysis the 
Figure 1.  Screenshot of Locaccino’s functionality that allows 
users to construct their location sharing policy rules.
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movement of user A was the same as recorded during the 
study. 
RESULTS
The study ran for a month with 340 users who were already 
users of Facebook.  The derived policy graph contained 
1778 policy rules, two for each of the 889 friendship ties 
within the user population (Figure 2).
Each policy described the openness of one user towards 
other users, ranging from 0 to 1.  For each user the average 
openness that they show towards their friends was 
calculated (referred to as “trust” towards others) and is 
summarised in Figure 3, while the average openness that a 
user was shown by his friends (i.e. their “trustworthiness”) 
is shown in Figure 4.
Hypothesis testing
H1: Individuals who are more central to the social graph are 
likely to reveal the most about their location.
A Kruskal_Wallis non-parametric test of independent 
samples [e.g. 12] showed that there was a significant effect 
of a node’s betweenness on that node’s trust towards its 
direct connections (H(45)=82.111, p<0.001) but not on that 
node’s trustworthiness (H(45)=56.168, p=0.123). 
Furthermore, there was a significant effect of degree 
centrality on node trust (H(23)=82.076, p<0.0001) and also 
on node trustworthiness (H(23)=35.276, p<0.05).
H2: The targetʼs friend with the highest degree has higher 
probability of knowing more about the target.
To test this hypothesis all users with less than 2 friends in 
the dataset were discarded from the analysis, leaving 247 
users.  This data was discarded because no comparison can 
Figure 3. Histogram of distribution of nodes’ average 
openness (i.e. the average of all outgoing ties for each node)
Figure 4. Histogram of nodes’ average trustworthiness (i.e. the 
average of all incoming ties for each node).
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Figure 5: Degree rank of nodes (x-axis) versus the average 
trust rank (y-axis)  for all nodes of a specific degree rank
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Figure 6. Histogram of Mutual rank (x-axis) vs. average trust 
rank (y-axis) for all nodes of a specific CommonFriends rank.
Figure 2. The graph representing the participants (nodes) and 
their trust relationships as directed edges. Mutually open 
relationships are highlighted in red.
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be carried out for users with a single friend. For each user 
A, all of A’s friends were ranked in terms of how much they 
are trusted by A (Trust Rank), and in terms of how many 
friends they actually have (Degree Rank). This gave for 
each friendship relationship in the data two values: Trust 
Rank and Degree Rank respectively (Figure 5). A chi-
square test showed a significant relationship between 
Degree Rank and Trust Rank (x^2=3981.723, dF=744, 
p<0.001) while there was a positive correlation between the 
two variables (0.239, p<0.01).
H3: The targetʼs friend with most common ties with the 
target knows most about the target.
To test this hypothesis all users with less than 2 friends 
were discarded from the analysis, leaving 247 users.  For 
each user A, all of A’s friends were ranked in terms of how 
much they know about A (Trust Rank), and in terms of how 
many mutual friends they have with A (Mutual Rank). This 
gave us for each friendship relationship in the data two 
values: Trust Rank and Mutual Rank respectively (Figure 
6).  A chi-square test showed a significant relationship 
between Mutual Rank and Trust Rank (x^2=3210.841, 
dF=682, p<0.001), while there was a positive correlation 
between the two variables (0.252, p<0.01).
Structural analysis
Finally, an analysis was conducted to assess the extent to 
which friends with the highest degree are the same as 
friends with a large number of common friends.  A chi-
square test showed a significant relationship between 
Degree Rank and Mutual Rank (x^2=6548.051, dF=528, 
p<0.001), and a positive correlation between Degree Rank 
and Mutual Rank of 0.81 (p<0.01) as shown in Figure 7.
Furthermore, a triad analysis was conducted, to assess the 
extent to which there exists a bias in how trust and 
trustworthiness was distributed across the network. The 
analysis was conducted by first classifying each bi-
directional edge in one of three possible states: balanced-
high (meaning both people are sharing in full or partially), 
balanced-low (meaning that both people are not sharing), 
and unbalanced (meaning that one person is sharing while 
the other is not). Given the three possible labels for each 
edge, there exist 10 possible “templates” for triads, 
depending on the combination of its bidirectional edges (see 
Table 1). Each triad in the graph was labelled appropriately, 
and the frequency of occurrence of each template was 
calculated.  
In addition, for each of the 10 templates the theoretical 
expected frequency of occurrence was calculated, as 
described in [19], by assuming that the same edges were 
randomly distributed on a graph with identical topography. 
The relationship between the observed and expected 
frequency for each of the 10 templates is shown in Figure 8. 
The figure shows a modest correlation (R^2=0.75), with the 
exception of the data point at (119,225)  corresponding to Figure 8. Correlation between the expected and observed frequencies for each of the 10 possible triad templates.
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Template Expected 
Frequency
Observed 
frequency
1 292 209
2 142 119
3 119 225
4 23 22
5 39 10
6 1 19
7 16 5
8 3 1
9 3 0
10 0.7 28
Unbalanced Balanced-Low Balanced-High
Table 1. Expected frequency (given a random model) and 
observed frequencies for each of the 10 possible triad 
templates.
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the template “Balanced-high, Unbalanced, Unbalanced”. 
Removal of this point would substantially improve the 
correlation (R^2=0.96).
DISCUSSION
Targeted location-sharing privacy attacks
This paper proposes a threat model related to location-
sharing privacy, whereby the attacker attempts to collect 
data about a target’s longitudinal movements. To do this, 
the attacker first needs to identify suitable targets such that 
his chances of success are maximised. Once a suitable 
target is identified, then the attacker attempts to gain access 
to the target in order to collect data about the target’s 
location, but not “too close” to avoid detection. Therefore, 
even though a strategy for collecting data on a target’s 
whereabouts would be to attempt to befriend the target 
directly, that increases the chances of the attacker being 
noticed. This paper assumes that the attacker can attempt to 
collect data about the target by befriending one of the 
target’s friends, i.e. a “weak link”. This will make the 
attacker a “friend of a friend” of the target, which is 
arguably adequate to gain access to the target’s location.  In 
order to achieve this, the attacker needs to figure out which 
of the target’s friend are more likely to have access to the 
target’s location data, and are therefore a more suitable 
person to befriend.  The results from Figure 3 show that, on 
average, nodes exhibit a bimodal distribution of trust which 
is weighted towards not sharing at all. Hence, if the attacker 
picks a target’s friend at random, they are about four times 
more likely to not gain access at all to the target’s data.
To assess the extent to which such an attack can be 
engineered, the study presented here answers two important 
questions relating to this kind of targeted location-sharing 
privacy attacks. First, given a group of users and the 
friendship ties amongst them, is it possible to predict which 
of these users is likely to reveal the most about their 
whereabouts?  Second, given an individual user within a 
particular social network, is it possible to predict which of 
her friends know most about her whereabouts? 
The study presented here captured a measure of “openness” 
between individuals, which reflects the probability that a 
request for someone’s real-time location is likely to be 
satisfied. An advantage of using a generic measure, which 
we refer to us trust (when a person of interest is open 
towards someone else) and trustworthiness (when someone 
else is open towards a person of interest), is that it can be 
applied across multiple features of online social networks. 
Therefore, while commercial location-sharing systems vary 
in features and their capabilities evolve over time, the 
measure of trust and trustworthiness is likely to remain an 
underlying  driver in guiding users’ decision to share their 
location with others.
Identifying a suitable target
The motivation for H1 was to suggest a way in which the 
attacker can identify users who are more likely to share 
their location with friends. The hypothesis was that 
individuals who are more central to the social network 
reveal the most about themselves, motivated by the 
observation that such individuals are more likely to engage 
in collaboration and coordination activities. Our results 
suggest that a user’s network centrality as measured by 
betweenness and degree centrality had a significant effect 
on the amount of trust that user was willing to show 
towards their friends, thus supporting hypothesis.
The results suggest that individuals who are more central to 
their network are more likely to be willing to share their 
location with others, and therefore they are good targets for 
a potential attacker. Hence, an attacker can conduct a basic 
analysis of the network structure to identify central nodes, 
and then attempt to target more central nodes since they are 
more likely to share their location.  It can be argued that 
individuals who are more central to the network are more 
socially active, and maintain more social relationships. This 
is likely to require them to take part in more social 
activities, and therefore it can be argued that these 
conditions require more coordination on their part. This 
offers one explanation as to why the findings in this study 
suggest that more central users did in fact share their 
location more often.
How to target individuals
Once the attacker has identified a target who is likely to be 
open and share their location, the next step is to develop a 
strategy for targeting that individual. The threat model 
discussed in this paper assumes that the attacker will not 
attempt to befriend the target directly, since that bears a 
high risk of being detected. Instead, the attacker can attempt 
to befriend someone from the target’s friends since that can 
give them access to the target’s location data without 
bringing them “too close” to the target.  Therefore, the next 
step for the attacker is to identify a “weak link” in the 
target’s list of friends, or a person who is likely to be 
granted access to the target’s location data. The study tested 
two possible strategies for identifying weak links: based on 
the number of friends that a weak link may have (H2), and 
based on the number of common friends that the weak link 
may have with the target (H3).
Prior studies have shown the importance of reciprocity in 
social interactions, thus providing the motivation for H2. 
More specifically, studies have shown that when an 
individual performs a favour or act that bestows trust upon 
another individual, that individual is likely to feel obliged to 
reciprocate the favour or act. The motivation for H2 comes 
from this perceived obligation and from H1. The results 
show a positive correlation between the amount of trust that 
an individual bestows on each of his friends and the number 
of friends of those friends. This suggests that the attacker 
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can identify a suitable “weak link” of the target by 
considering the target’s list of friends and identifying those 
individuals with the highest number of friends of their own. 
Such individuals are more likely to be social active, and are 
therefore more likely to choose to share their location with 
the target (see H1). The target, by virtue of reciprocity, is 
therefore more likely to share their location with such 
individuals. 
A competing, and possibly complementary hypothesis for 
identifying weak links is H3, which states that the target’s 
friend with most common ties with the target knows most 
about the target’s whereabouts. This can be due to the fact 
that the existence of common friends can indicate shared 
membership in a community or organisation. The results 
show that there is a significant positive correlation between 
the trust of a target towards each of his friends and the rank 
of that friend in terms of the number of mutual friends he 
has with the target. The results provide a clear strategy for 
how an attacker can identify a “weak link”, which entails 
identifying who from the target’s list of friends has the 
highest number of common friends with the target. One 
explanation for these findings is that individuals who share 
many friends, and are thus likely to belong to the same 
social groups, are more likely to share their location in 
order to coordinate their activities better, as well as to 
maintain an increased awareness of each other’s ongoing 
activities.  
Finally, it should be pointed out that the analysis provides 
evidence that H2 and H3 are directly related. Since both 
hypotheses were supported by the analysis, this is not 
surprising.  The results show a strong positive correlation 
between H2 and H3 in that a target’s friends who have 
many friends are also likely to have a lot of common friends 
with the target. One explanation for this relationship may be 
that individuals who have many friends of their own are 
more likely to be extroverts who socialise and engage in 
multiple social interactions activities. Their behaviour 
therefore increases the likelihood of them being friends 
with mutual friends with the target simply because they 
have a lot of friends.
Triads and small group privacy
The results of the structural analysis presented here offer 
insights into how, in the context of location-sharing, triads 
of users distribute and balance trust and trustworthiness. In 
addition to being useful in understanding the behaviour of 
our participants, these results are also useful in situations 
where only partial information may be known about the 
network.
The structural analysis shows that even though under a 
completely random model we expected to observe only one 
triad where all three members trust each other (template 10 
in Table 1), we actually observed 28 such triads. 
Furthermore, the correlation analysis highlights triad 
template 3 as being substantially different from the overall 
correlation pattern between expected and observed 
frequencies. In this case, this result shows that we observed 
quite often situations where two people trust each other but 
both maintain unbalanced relationships with a third 
individual. This is a balanced situation and expected to be 
more frequent in a realistic setting than in a purely random 
environment  [e.g. 11].
The results from this analysis coincide with prior work in 
that people tend to avoid unbalanced situations and prefer 
the comfort of balanced triads .  Furthermore, these results 
can be used to make predictions in situations where 
incomplete information has been collected about 
individuals. This is possible since given three individuals 
and 2 of the 3 relationships between them, we may be able 
to predict the third relationships. For example, given a triad 
with two balanced-high relationships, the chances of the 
third relationship being balanced-low is very close to zero, 
unbalanced is 15%, and balanced-high is 85%.
Protection against such privacy attacks
The attack described here assumes that the attacker is trying 
to gain longitudinal access to the target’s whereabouts, and 
does so by avoiding detection since they do not need to 
befriend the target directly, but only one of their friends. 
Assuming that on average users have about 150 friends in a 
social network, then the attacker’s strategy ensures that he 
is one of about 22000 people who are friends-of-friends of 
the target, making detection much harder.
One strategy that the platform could follow in case of a 
pull-based location-sharing model would be to ensure that 
individuals are notified if anyone is making too many 
location-sharing requests. This could be implemented in the 
form of a user-defined threshold or as a nudging mechanism 
intended to help people refine their sharing preferences [3]. 
In the case of a push-based model, the users can ensure that 
their information is visible only to their friends directly, and 
to no-one beyond that. Similarly, limits could be imposed 
on how often a user can update their location, hence 
offering an upper bound on how much users can reveal 
about their whereabouts.  However, such solutions seem to 
contradict the needs of commercial systems which appear to 
strive for increasing the amount of shared information. 
Making useful predictions
While the work described here was framed in the context of 
a privacy attack, the hypotheses that were tested may be 
useful in developing user-friendly features that can 
automatically provide useful suggestions to users. For 
instance, the hypotheses discussed earlier provide an 
indication on how to identify a person who is likely to know 
the whereabouts of an individual of interest. It may be the 
case that the individual of interest has not logged into the 
location-sharing system to update their location, due to 
technical difficulties, time constraints, or any other 
plausible difficulty. Under such circumstances, the system 
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may be able to make automated suggestions about who to 
ask regarding the whereabouts of the person of interest 
based on a simplistic network-structure analysis. Therefore, 
in cases of high urgency it is possible to offer such 
recommendations as a fall-back strategy.
Limitations of the study
In a realistic environment there may be multiple factors 
affecting the sharing of information, many of which are 
inadvertently manipulated by users.  For instance, battery 
life and group norms may be important factors that urge 
users to hide or share their location.  These were not taken 
into account in this study.
Furthermore, this study presents and tests a generic strategy 
for engineering such an attack. Clearly, the fine details of 
the social platform where this information is recorded and 
shared are important, and may facilitate or hinder the 
success of such an attack. For instance, being friend of a 
friend may be “too close” or “too far” to obtain location 
information, while some auditing mechanism may allow 
users to see who is viewing their location information 
repeatedly.
Finally, it is important to take into consideration here the 
fact that users of this location sharing application start with 
a default privacy policy of not sharing their location 
information with anybody in the network. We cannot rule 
this out a contributing factor to our result that more central 
nodes trust more, as they are also likely to be seasoned 
users of the system and hence have invested more time to 
articulate their location sharing preferences.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents a study that aims to answer two 
important questions related to targeted location-sharing 
privacy attacks: (1)  given a group of users and their social 
graph, is it possible to predict which among them is likely 
to reveal most about their whereabouts, and (2) given a 
user, is it possible to predict which among her friends 
knows most about her whereabouts.
The results show that users who are more central to their 
social network (both locally and globally) are more likely to 
share information about their location, and hence are more 
“vocal”.  In addition, the findings show that given a target, 
that target’s friend who either has many friends or many 
common friends with the target is more likely to be trusted 
by the target.
The findings of this study are important both in 
understanding how privacy attacks can be engineered and 
how they can be prevented.  An important next step for this 
work is the application of these insights for the 
development of automated protection and suggestion 
mechanisms that will make the sharing of real-time location 
safer and more useful.
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